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INTRODUCTION 
Few would disagree that more quantitative analysis  of agricultural trade liberalization was 
conducted prior to  and during  the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations  than accompanied  any 
previous round.  This analysis ranged from the design of alternative summary measures of agricultural 
support and protection (PSE, SMU, IDE, PAG, AMS, etc.), through analysis of specific modality 
issues, to the complex simulation of multi-sector, multi-commodity trade liberalization scenarios using 
computable general equilibrium models. 
As economists, we would like to think that this analysis contributed in a positive way to the 
successful  conclusion  of the  Uruguay  Round  and  to  a  process  that will  eventually  lead  to  the 
"normalization" of the rules governing agricultural trade (J  osling, et al.). 1 
Was  quantitative analysis  of trade liberalization  helpful in  the process of negotiating the 
Uruguay Round outcome?  Views on this topic differ, but two active participants in the process paint 
a less  than flattering portrait.  Sumner has argued that 
"The policy models were too aggregated, and dealt with the irrelevant policy options, 
and contained overly simplified or just incorrect specifications of  relevant policies. The 
many  projections  of the  effects  of free  trade  or elimination  of all  farm  policies 
available  in  the academic  literature were  positively  harmful  to  policy  formulation 
because they did not relate to actual policy options, contained numerous errors or 
were mistakenly cited by some in political debate". 
In a similar vein Gardner (1993, p. 384) has  argued that 
"General equilibrium models seem a natural approach ... but the approach has  not been 
illuminating  for  analyzing  possible  GATT agreements  because  the  key  elements  of the 
proposals are micro adjustments of non-standard policy instruments ...  " 
On a more positive note Sumner (p. 7)  did argue that "academic policy modelling was  useful in the 
1 
It is sometimes argued that agriculture has,  at long last, been brought fully into the GATT. 
It can be more reasonably argued that substantial progress was made towards this goal during 
the Uruguay Round.  However, given the exceptional treatment still afforded agriculture, the 
goal itself remains elusive and it is one which will have to be tackled again in future rounds 
of trade negotiations. 2 
very early stages of the Uruguay Round leading up to the beginning of the negotiations." 
We will  argue that the quantitative analysis  of agricultural  trade liberalization  played  an 
important role in the trade negotiation process.  Even so, there is  little disagreement that in some 
respects the analysis was  woefully inadequate, and that, as  the negotiations progressed, it became 
increasingly irrelevant.  This happened because the negotiations moved into areas, as Gardner (1993) 
notes, that were difficult to handle in traditional models and because modellers, even those within 
government, found it difficult to keep up with the current state of play.  In some cases (for example, 
the tariffication of Canada's import quotas which underpin its domestic supply control programs), the 
topics  were  considered  to  be  too  sensitive  politically  to  be seriously  discussed  by  government 
economists, let alone analyzed.  However, with a few  exceptions, even university economists were 
silent on these topics (Moschini and Meilke; Meilke and Larue, 1989b). 
While hundreds of research papers were written about the Uruguay Round, and many  of 
these contained quantitative analysis, it is  our view that the comprehensive "big model" analyses of 
multilateral trade liberalization had the most impact.  We return to discuss these in a later section. 
The remainder of our paper is  structured as  follows.  In the next sections we outline the 
objectives of the GAIT negotiations and the ways in which quantitative trade analysis can contribute. 
We then catalogue the outputs and the contributions of quantitative analysis to the Uruguay Round 
achievements.  Following this we discuss the likely  agenda of the next round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, which will  largely  define the demand for  traditional  and  new  forms  of quantitative 
information.  We conclude  by  developing  a  list  of analytical  challenges  facing  the profession  in 
providing relevant and useful information, not only to trade negotiators but to the general public. 3 
WHAT IS THE GATT/WfO? 
Since 1947, the GAIT has provided a set of principles and rules to govern the ways in which 
national governments may interfere in international trade between firms  (or plants) located in their 
territory and firms  (or plants of the same firm)  located in the territory of another member country 
(GAIT signatory).  Over time,  as  the number of GAIT members  has  grown,  these rules  have 
covered a larger proportion of total international trade in goods.  Anticipating the accession of China 
and  Russia,  we  have  the prospect  that,  soon,  all  major  trading  countries  of the world  will  be 
subscribing to the same rules.  The vast majority of international trade in products and services will 
then be protected by these constraints on national government actions. 
Taken literally, the GAIT refers to a negotiated agreement - a set of rules.  In common usage 
it often means an institution in Geneva, the GAIT Secretariat, which was created to facilitate and 
service the ongoing business between governments associated with the original agreement, including 
periodic "rounds" of negotiations to establish and reduce tariff "bindings", and to refine and extend 
the original rules.  From now on,  this  confusing double usage will  no longer be necessary,  as  the 
GAIT Secretariat has been elevated to the status of a full-blown  multilateral institution, on a par 
with the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations.  It is  called the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  The WTO will manage the ongoing business not only of the GAIT, but also of a whole new 
agreement generated by the Uruguay Round, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
It is important to remember that the GAIT/GATS/WTO will not dictate how firms conduct 
their international commerce.  International commercial law  is  not part of its business.  However, 
in  providing  rules  on  national government behaviour,  the GAIT may  constrain the nature of 
national regulations governing the way in which firms in an individual country are allowed to conduct 
their international business.  Such regulations should not be discriminatory, for example. 
The fundamental goals  and principles agreed to in  1947 endure, and are relatively simple. 4 
It might be argued that the long-term goal is  to liberalize (remove barriers to) international trade, 
though this is more implicit than explicit. The underlying philosophy is  that increased trade benefits 
all countries. 
The more immediate and explicit pre-occupation of the GATT (1947) was  with fair  trade 
rather  than  free  trade.  While,  and  to  the  extent  that,  barriers  remain,  they  should  be  non-
discriminatory and transparent.  The goal of transparency is translated into a tariffs-only principle 
for remaining barriers.  The principle of non-nullification is  intended to ensure that governments 
could not take actions which would effectively nullify the benefits to others of concessions (eg. tariff 
bindings)  they  had  already  granted.  The  Uruguay  Round  succeeded  in  cleaning  up  some 
discrimination inherent in the GATT (agreement) itself by removing many of the country-specific 
exceptions and waivers, and moving away  from supplementary "codes" to which only subsets of the 
membership subscribed.  All members of the WTO will be obliged to adhere to the whole agreement, 
rather than  being  able to  pick and choose parts of it  as  they have been able to do in  the past. 
Another principle, yet to be given effect in agriculture (only), is  a ban on export subsidization. 
Krugman and others have argued that the thinking underlying the GATT of 1947,  and the 
way countries have conducted their negotiations since, is very mercantilist.  He boils down "GATT-
think"  to beliefs  that (1)  exports  are good,  (2)  imports are bad and,  importantly,  (3)  in  total the 
"good" of exports outweighs the "bad" of imports.  This third belief explains why countries continue 
to  pursue  multilateral  trade  liberalization.  The  first  two  explain  why  individual  countries,  in 
negotiations, seek to maximize opportunities (obtained) to increase their exports while minimizing 
opportunities (given up) to increase their own imports. 
Most economists have difficulty with the idea that imports are bad, and urge politicians to 
liberalize unilaterally.  In small countries with little negotiating leverage (Hong Kong, Singapore, New 
Zealand)  they sometimes  succeed.  There are  a number of possible explanations  for  politician's 5 
failure, in most cases, to heed such advice.  In larger countries, some commentators see the reluctance 
of politicians to give up their trade restrictions not as implying that they don't believe in the economic 
gains from unilateral liberalization, but rather that they see the possibility of even larger gains if their 
"stock" of liberalization potential is saved to be sold to the highest bidder in international negotiations 
(akin to selling your old unwanted junk in a yard sale in preference to giving it away to a charity). 
Others argue that the explanation lies in the greater political influence and power of those who stand 
to lose from trade liberalization (eg., many farmers)  relative to those who stand to gain (eg.,  many 
consumers).  Most economists dislike this argument on the grounds that governments should be able 
to organize things so that the gainers fully compensate the losers, and still have money in the bank. 
However, these same economists have failed to come up with practical and acceptable ways for this 
to be done. 
Mercantilist, misguided and misinformed or not, the MTN process is moving towards free or 
freer trade, and that is a goal which most economists can endorse.  Even the new trade theorists, who 
can rationalize strategic unilateral trade interventions from the point of view of national advantage, 
tend to agree that "optimal tariffs" are usually relatively low, and free trade is usually preferable when 
foreign  retaliation  is  taken into  account  (Krugman,  Bhagwati).  So,  endorsing the goals  of the 
GATf/WTO, how do (or can) economists contribute to progress towards them? 
HOW ECONOMISTS INFLUENCE THE MTN PROCESS 
It may not be over-simplifying to say that the UR negotiations on agriculture went through 
three phases, which might be called a "conceptual" phase, a "technical" phase and a "political" phase. 
2 
What we call the conceptual phase preceded the official beginning of the Round in 1986.2 
We are indebted to David Harvey for pointing out the contributions of economists during the 
conceptual phase. 6 
Its main result was  the agreement, in the Punta del Este declaration, that there would have to be 
reduction commitments in two broad areas,  - (1)  import barriers, and (2)  the negative effects on 
trade of subsidies and other measures acting directly ("export subsidies") or indirectly ("domestic 
support").  A third area of focus  for  the agricultural negotiations,  agreed to at this  time, was  the 
minimization of the adverse effects of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations on agricultural trade. 
The technical phase followed  the UR "kick-off'  and corresponded approximately  to  the 
tenure of Mr. de Zeeuw as chairman of the agricultural negotiations (until late 1990).  During this 
phase,  which  was  largely  conducted  by  trade  bureaucrats,  the  modalities  of the  agricultural 
negotiations were largely established.  The first  two broad areas for commitment defined in 1986 
were,  by  1991,  refined  to  include  disaggregated  volume  and  expenditure  reductions  on export 
subsidies  from  a  1986-90  base,  tariffication  of all  non-tariff barriers,  binding  and simple-average 
formula  reductions  of  all  tariffs  from  a  1986-88  base,  formula-controlled  special  agricultural 
safeguards, formula-determined dis aggregated minimum quantitative access at lower tariff rates for 
tariffied products, a well defined AMS (including what types of  support had to be counted, the "fIXed 
reference price" principle, and the "de minimus" concept), dis aggregated reductions in that AMS, and 
so on.  Economists from several countries, mainly in the roles of government employees or advisors, 
had considerable input during the technical phase. 
The third, political phase, can be thought of as embracing the negotiations proper.  Ministers 
(or Secretaries, in the case of the U.S.) slipped into the driver's seat, and were actually at the table 
when the important deals were cut, - in places like Blair House as much as Geneva.  When they were 
not physically at the table they were in close contact with their subordinates, who were careful not 
to move without ministerial authority.  During this phase, ministers sorted out which modalities they 
could live with, diluted or scuttled the others, and decided how far they could go (depth of cuts) with 
those that remained. 7 
In contrast to the first two phases, the influence of economists during the "real" negotiations 
(political phase) was relatively small, in our judgement.  What there was, was of two sorts:  one direct 
and one indirect.  The direct influence involved mainly government economists providing ministers 
with information helpful to them in conducting the negotiations.  Much of this information was  in 
the nature of reassurance that the final  agreement, if signed, would not be a political disaster at 
home,  - that credible numbers  existed showing  benefits clearly  outweighing costs,  that required 
adjustments to existing programs would be minor and technically feasible,  that farm incomes would 
not suffer or, that the GAIT agreement would facilitate domestic reforms.  The indirect influence 
(of non-government economists) came through the information provided actively or passively,  to 
stakeholders.  This information affected the balance of pressures being brought on the minister by 
different groups to act in different ways  in the negotiations. 
Based on the experience of the UR, economists should be able to do more of the same to 
influence  the  next  round  of multilateral  negotiations.  By  illustrating  the size  of the  potential 
economic gains from further liberalization, we can help to build momentum.  By getting involved in 
the early technical stages of the negotiations, we can help to ensure that sensible rules and modalities 
are adopted,  that perverse effects  are  avoided  and  that loopholes which  allow  circumvention of 
commitments are closed.  We can work through the details of how changes would be implemented 
and how existing support could be refocused to maintain benefits while reducing trade distortions and 
meeting new commitments.  Perhaps, only a small portion of this work requires large sophisticated 
quantitative models, which will be more useful in the early stages and less so in the later stages of 
the negotiations. 8 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO THE AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT IN 
THE URUGUAY ROUND 
Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Aggregate Measures of Support 
A significant contribution of economic analysis, early on, was the calculation and publication 
of rates of protection.  Although many measures were floated, most were variations on the 'Producer 
Subsidy  Equivalent'  (PSE),  reported by  the FAO and  attributed to  the work by  Josling3.  The 
development of the PSE concept to include domestic support was  influenced by Corden, who had 
earlier advanced the nominal rate of protection measure for border measures.  As a modified nominal 
rate of protection,  the PSE essentially  measures,  for  each country  and commodity,  the level  of 
consumer  and  taxpayer  transfers  to  (or  from)  farmers.  It  summarizes,  in  a  convenient  form, 
information that each country is  already obliged to furnish to the GATT in the form of a 'subsidies 
notification' under Article XVI, but it goes one step further by including consumer transfers.  The 
main institutions  calculating this information prior to and during the UR were the OECD (1993) and 
the USDA (Webb, et al.). 
Several variations of and alternatives to the PSE were also  advanced including Australia's 
PAG (Haszler  and  Parsons),  Canada's  IDE (de  Gorter  and  McClatchy),  the effective  rate  of 
protection  (ERP) and  the EU's SMU,  to  mention just a  few.  The beo.efits  of such accounting 
procedures were manifold and quickly realized.  Everyone was informed as to the nature and degree 
of government intervention across commodity groups and between countries.  Although the methods 
and measures differed across  the various  agencies reporting the rates of protection, the degree of 
transparency of agricultural policies was  greatly enhanced (Cahill and Legg,  Schwartz and Parker, 
lATRC 1990).  Separating taxpayer from consumer transfers, and domestic from border measures 
(not to mention tariff versus non-tariff border measures), also enhanced the understanding of the 
3  Josling's original work was  published by the FAO (1975) while some recent reflections are 
contained in Josling (1993). 9 
situation.  This helped in putting agriculture on the top of the agenda for the forthcoming Uruguay 
Round. 
While PSEs do not recognize differences, between policies, in the degree of trade distortion 
and in the effectiveness of government in achieving agricultural policy goals, their measurement did 
serve to illustrate the extent of intervention and its  pervasiveness world-wide (de Gorter, Hertel 
(1989), McClatchy).  There are no lily white countries when it comes to agricultural protectionism. 
For example, net percentage PSEs for all commodities in 1987 were 40,  42,  49 and 76 percent for 
the United States, Canada, European Union and Japan, respectively (OECD, 1993).  The OECD 
(1993) analysis also showed that producers in the European Union and Japan received most of their 
support in the form of market price supports which distorts both consumer and producer prices. 
Even in Canada and the U.S., where assistance to the agricultural sector is less biased towards market 
price supports, this form of protection still comprised more than 50% of the total assistance. 
Further analysis by the OECD illustrated the difficulty of agricultural policy reform because 
the benefits of trade liberalization are diffuse while its costs are concentrated.  It  was estimated that 
in 1987, total per capita income transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agriculture amounted to 
about  $350  in  Canada,  the European Union  and  the United States  while  transfers  per farmer 
averaged $10,000 in the European Union, $17,000 in Canada and $26,000 in the United States.  The 
PSE estimates also raised the issue of equity across commodities and across countries.  It  illustrated, 
in  stark terms,  the horrendous  gross  transfers  (cost)  involved  in  supporting  and protecting the 
agricultural sector. 
Modelling the Effects of Agricultural Trade Liberalization 
The PSEs were not designed to measure the gains from trade nor the amount of the gross 
transfers  that actually  reached  farmers  in  the form  of net income gains.  This  gap  was  partially 10 
fulfilled by  the models  analyzing trade liberalization which illustrated the potential changes in  the 
market price, production, consumption and trade resulting from either unilateral or multilateral trade 
liberalization.  These studies were concentrated in  the hands  of a relatively few  researchers  and 
research institutions, and at the risk of slighting someone's work the following contributions seem to 
have been the most influential:  1)  IIASA (Parikh, et al.);  2)  OECD-MTM; 3) Stoeckel, et al.;  4) 
USDA-SWOPSIM (Roningen and Dixit); 5) Tyers and Anderson; and 6) FAPRI (Helmar, et al.). 
Two of  these modelling efforts involved general equilibrium models and the others partial equilibrium 
models.4  The works  of IIASA,  OECD and Stoeckel et al.  were published early in  the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations.  For the most part, they were single research contributions which illustrated 
the classical gains  from  trade.  The contributions of USDA-SWOPSIM, Tyers  and Anderson and 
F  APRI  were  ongoing  throughout  the  negotiations,  and  encompassed  a  series  of papers  and 
monographs focussed on various aspects of the trade negotiations. 
These models contributed to the debate in a number of  ways.  First, the gains from trade from 
unilateral liberalization were highlighted.  These were contrasted with the higher gains  from trade 
from multilateral liberalization and the moderating effect on any producer losses.  For example, the 
farm income losses from unilateral trade liberalization in Canada for 1986-87 were estimated to be 
a whopping $3.7 billion (Roningen and Dixit).  However, multilateral liberalization moderated the 
producer loss  to a mere $1.3 billion.  The analysis was effectively presented by highlighting the fact 
that approximately 65 percent of Canada's then existing support to farmers was  necessary simply to 
offset the downward price effects of its  own and other countries policies.  On a global scale, the 
analogous figure was  40  percent (Blandford; IATRC 1988).  This  observation struck a responsive 
4 
These models differ considerably in  terms of their country and commodity coverage, for a 
review of some of the early models see Meilke and Larue (1989a) and Blandford.  For some 
general observations concerning the modelling of trade liberalization see Abbott, Sharples, 
Tyers and Romer. 11 
chord, even in farm audiences, because it emphasized that much of farm support was self-defeating 
among  subsidizing  nations  and  that  world  price  increases  would  dampen  farm  losses  from 
liberalization.  It thus made a substantial contribution to the general realization that current policies 
were politically unsustainable, as well as economically irrational, and to the conclusion that "something 
had to be done." 
Second, the models allowed one to attribute the blame for the disarray in agricultural markets 
to particular countries.  Not surprisingly, the policies of the European Union and the United States 
accounted for the lion's share of the distortions in world markets because of their large size.  While, 
collectively,  the  agricultural  policies  of the  other smaller  developed  countries  were  of modest 
importance, and in certain cases, such as  rice in Japan, of considerable importance, the "agricultural 
problem" was  largely centred in the United States and the European Union. 
Third, the models  also captured, albeit imperfectly, the cross sector effects of agricultural 
policies.  For example, the negative effects of market price supports in the grain and oilseed sectors 
on the livestock sector highlighted the self-defeating aspects of the status quo.  Likewise, potential 
gains  from  trade liberalization for  the export and processing sectors of the economy were pitted 
against  the  losses  to  the  import  competing  agricultural  sectors  within  the  same  country.  This 
emphasized that not only were farmers in other countries their own worst enemies, so too were other 
farm groups in the same country impeding progress for growth in their market. 
General equilibrium model results complemented the partial equilibrium results by illustrating 
input adjustments, resource flows  between agriculture and the general economy, changes  in farm 
factor returns, food marketing (processing) margins and the effects on food manufacturing, and non-
food  demand.  All  of these  features  generated  a  more  realistic  scenario  as  to  the  level  and 
distribution of the benefits and costs derived from trade liberalization.  For example, delineation of 
factor returns allowed the analysis of  wealth effects and of the capitalization of benefits derived from 12 
farm  programs.  Modelling  resource  flows  between agriculture  and  the  non-agricultural sectors 
emphasized the tax imposed by farm policy on the rest of the economy and the opportunity cost of 
labour held in agriculture due to farm policies.  Furthermore, potential benefits to agriculture from 
trade liberalization in the non-agricultural sectors were highlighted, when liberalization in all sectors 
was simulated.  Nevertheless, the level of technical detail as  to the true economic structure and the 
manner in which policies affect agent's behaviour can always be improved upon, either for partial or 
general equilibrium models. 
Reinstrumentation 
The simplistic representation of policies in the early agricultural trade liberalization models 
led to analysis on how different policies generated substantially different trade distortions (de Gorter 
and Meilke,  Gardner 1983).  This  contributed to a careful assessment of how the PSE could be 
segmented into various categories and to the policy reversal by the United States, at mid-term, for 
a green-amber-red light designation rather than a complete elimination of all  policy interventions, 
regardless of their trade distorting effects. 
Subsequent analysis focused on transfer efficiency and the various leakages associated with 
income transfers to farmers.  In addition to the world price depressing effects of agricultural policies 
the analysis showed that farmers shared benefits with upstream (input supplying) and downstream 
(output using)  industries,  and  in  some instances,  with  consumers.  Farmer  compliance costs  in 
addition to administration costs also showed the inefficacy of current programs.  There was even some 
analysis as  to how the remaining benefits, as small as  they were, were unevenly distributed between 
large and small farms. 
A  closely  related  line  of research  involved  the  realization  that  progress  towards  trade 
liberalization could be made by  reinstrumenting domestic agricultural policies  away from  the most 13 
trade distorting forms of support and towards more trade friendly policies.  The  IATRC published 
two  monographs on the subject and this basic idea is  embedded in the final  form of the Uruguay 
Round's  Agreement  on  Agriculture  (IATRC  1988,  Magiera,  et  al,).  Calls  for  infra-marginal 
production subsidies, of which U.S.-style frozen base yields were highlighted as a potential element, 
emphasized the importance of providing a politically palatable transition from  the status quo to a 
more liberal trading regime.  For example, how much economic analysis contributed to the European 
Union's  shift  away  from  market  price  supports  and  towards  direct  payments  is  impossible  to 
determine.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that the co-existence of the analysis and the reform 
direction was entirely coincidental. 
Summary Assessment 
The above seems to be an impressive and long list of activity.  But did it all do any good? 
It must be recognized that little progress will be achieved by the major players in terms of 
agricultural trade liberalization for the next 6 years with the possible exception of Japan (Hathaway). 
Hathaway argues  that the EU will  contribute little to trade  liberalization, while  the influence of 
Canada and the United States will be imperceptible.  Perhaps another useful indicator of the lack 
of immediate progress in agricultural liberalization is provided by figures contained in a paper on the 
UR impacts published by Canada's Department of Finance (1994).  They cite an earlier OECD study 
as  showing full  agricultural trade liberalization (alone) to have the potential to increase Canada's 
GNP by 1.3 percent.  However, Finance Canada's assessment of the actual Agricultural Agreement 
in the Uruguay Round is that it will raise Canadian GNP by only 0.03 percent.  It  would appear from 
this that only 2 percent of the potential benefits to the Canadian economy from  agricultural trade 
liberalization were achieved in the Uruguay Round. 
Should economists shoulder part of the blame for the meagre results actually achieved?  Did 14 
the quantitative information provided on potential losses to farmers impede political progress more 
than the information on potential benefits to society did to encourage progress?  Given this rather 
modest progress towards  agricultural trade liberalization (our principal goal identified in section 2 
above),  was  economists'  net  contribution  to  this  positive  or  negative?  It  is  conceivable  that 
economist's information reached, and fueled the efforts of, the defenders of the status quo more than 
it influenced the political activism of those who stood to gain from change.  The big wild  card in 
determining whether the overall influence of economists will be positive or negative with respect to 
progress with trade liberalization, is  how much they are able to motivate the potential gainers  to 
political action.  In this regard, there was very little evidence of success in the UR.  The fact is that 
the main potential winners from agricultural trade liberalization are largely outside the agricultural 
sector in most industrial countries, and are not the groups which ministers of agriculture are in the 
habit of listening to.  Furthermore, these  potential gains  tend to be spread thinly  across  a wide 
spectrum of society, so few  individuals  are motivated to organization or action.  Non-agricultural 
interests, though potentially affected in a major way, exerted little influence in the UR in agriculture. 
The limited success which was achieved in agriculture, in the UR, was largely due to the tactic 
of some countries of holding agreement in other (non-agricultural) areas hostage to some progress 
in  agriculture.  Such leverage may  not be possible the next  time  around.  A real danger of little 
further progress in agriculture exists unless the interests of the potential gainers are translated into 
significant political pressures in a way which has not happened in the past. 
Do economists have a role in this?  We think so.  They could do a better job of explaining 
and communicating the potential benefits broadly in society.  The Australians did blitz the European 
non-rural community in the early 1980's in an attempt to stir up support for agricultural policy reform. 
But this was a national interest motivation involving government economists.  Why have economists 
in Europe and North America not themselves been more publicly vocal, as  individuals? 15 
NEGOTIATING AGENDA FOR THE NEXT ROUND(S):  THE ISSUES 
The Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture includes provisions for a new set of 
agricultural negotiations to begin in 1999.  Some predict that this will be a "mini-round" involving only 
agriculture.  There will  probably be simultaneous on-going negotiations on trade in services,  and 
perhaps other areas, but it is not clear if there will be any effort to link or synchronize negotiations 
in  different areas.  The UR may  prove  to have been the last  "comprehensive"  round;  the ever-
broadening scope of activity of the WTO may make it impractical to again try to do everything at 
once.  Nevertheless, whether or not the future sees the end of comprehensive rounds, it is  difficult 
to  envisage  seasoned  negotiators  being  able  to  reach  common  agreement  to  completely 
compartmentalize future negotiations.  Leverage from adjacent or even relatively unrelated areas may 
still be used to secure progress in agriculture. 
Gradually, over time, we expect that the special rules and provisions for agriculture will be 
whittled  away.  This,  in  turn,  will  mean  that  what  goes  on  in  the  more  generic  areas,  -
subsidies!countervail, intellectual property, trade-related investment, services, and so on -will assume 
increasing importance for the agricultural sector.  Agricultural trade specialists will conceivably have 
something useful to say about these areas too.  In this section, we focus, in particular, on the agenda 
for  the  next set of agricultural  negotiations,  starting in  1999,  but also  say  something about key 
agricultural-interest agenda items for upcoming negotiations, of as-yet-indefinite timing, in other areas 
under the general WTO auspices. 
1999 Agricultural Agenda 
We expect the 4-part focus  (export competition, market access, domestic support, sanitary-
phytosanitary) of the UR to be retained.  It is  also conceivable that the agenda could be as simple 16 
as a negotiation of  further cuts, with an agreement not to tinker with the rules or modalities.  Smooth 
dispute-free sailing in the interim would be predisposing to this,  but seems unlikely.  We therefore 
expect that there will be some fine-tuning of the modalities and rules in each area, and possibilities 
for this are laid out below. 
Export Competition 
Elimination of export subsidies may be possible in some areas like grains (if world prices are 
close to EU support prices  in  1999,  and  if the U.S.  1995  Farm Bill  has  ushered in changes) but 
negotiations  about  further  incremental  cuts  seem  inevitable  in  at least some  commodity  areas. 
Tangermann has suggested  combining volumetric and expenditure reductions in a single formula 
reduction  which  would  provide  some  flexibility  on each.  If practical  difficulties  with  the  UR 
commitments eventuate then this proposal may be considered.  Another issue which may well arise 
is whether the next set of commitments should be taken at a more dis aggregated level, - eg., on live 
animals  and different beef cuts, on wheat and flour,  and on individual feed grains, separately.  In 
addition,  there will  be  the question of choice of base  period  for  reductions  (1986-90  could  be 
retained). 
Modalities of reduction commitments aside, export subsidy definitions may have to be revisited 
to  prevent  circumvention.  The definition  may  have  to  be expanded  to  include  some  types  of 
government-provided export credit (guarantees) and food  aid  if monitoring in coming years yields 
evidence of their use as  a vehicle for avoiding export subsidy disciplines.  Some countries will  be 
looking closely at price  pooling schemes, particularly where the domestic price clearly exceeds the 
export price, and asking if they are not equivalent to producer-funded export subsidies.  Similarly, we 
know  that many  in  the U.S.  want  to  see GATT disciplines  strengthened for  national single-desk 
exporting agencies. 17 
Market Access 
Here there are many issues which could be on the agenda.  First there are several options for 
further bound tariff reductions.  If  formula-based, should the minimum cut required be closer to the 
average?  Should the average be trade-weighted rather than simple?  Should within-quota tariff rates 
be exempted from  reduction or treated separately?  Should a "swiss  formula"  be used,  as  recently 
suggested by Tangermann, to more quickly whittle down tariff "peaks" and reduce between-commodity 
differences in protection?  Or should the process revert to the old "request/offer" approach? 
In the non-agricultural  market  access  negotiations  during  the Uruguay Round there was 
considerable discussion of tariff peaks, which were generally in  the range of 25-50 percent.  The 
Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture has  created tariff "mountains" ranging between 100 and 
500 percent.  These tariffs have been "sold" to domestic agricultural interests as providing long-term 
protection to the most sensitive sectors of the domestic agricultural economy.  A comparison of these 
very high tariff rates to the average level of protection in the manufacturing sector is bound to draw 
the attention of exporters in the next round.  This will serve to focus the debate on the most heavily 
protected and sensitive sectors of the domestic agricultural economy. 
There will be the issue of whether quantitative access commitments should be expanded, and 
options here could include providing for a trade-off between expansion of quantitative access and the 
rate of over-quota tariff reduction (generalising the option currently granted to Japan and Korea on 
rice).  Experience over the next few years may dictate the desirability of adjustments to the special 
agricultural safeguard formulae - either to the price trigger or the volume trigger or both, - or even 
consideration of eliminating it,  if it has  not proven useful.  At the least, a decision will be needed 
about whether to retain the 1986-88 reference price. 
There will probably be some issues to be resolved, and possibly new rules developed, relating 
to tariff rate quota administration.  Large rents are associated with these quotas.  The way they are 18 
administered largely determines the extent to which the benefits accrue to the exporting country 
rather than the importing country.  Some are allocated to specific countries, others are supposed to 
be available on an MFN basis.  As  Hathaway has discussed, the size of rents associated with these 
tariff rate quotas may induce considerable political pressure to resist their expansion, and also to resist 
the reduction of over-quota tariffs.  The level of aggregation of quantitative access commitments will 
also come under scrutiny. 
A  further set of access  issues  are likely to come up with  respect to monopoly importing 
agencies.  Mark-ups of some of these agencies have been bound in the UR like tariffs, but within the 
limits of the tariff and mark-up bindings,  the operation of minimum import price schemes will still 
be possible.  Cases  like  Japanese pork and EU apple import regimes  will  no doubt be watched 
carefully in the intervening years. 
Domestic Support 
Again,  the  list  of items  on  the  potential  agenda  is  long.  To  begin  with,  should  AMS 
reductions be continued?  Should they be dis aggregated?  Is a new base period needed? Tangermann 
has  suggested  that  the definition of price support needs  broadening  to  include cases  where  no 
administered price exists, which are presently excluded from the AMS. 
There is  the issue of what to  do with the ''blue box"  (mainly  EU compensatory and U.S. 
deficiency payments) - also currently excluded from the AMS.  Seen as temporary by many countries, 
its  continued  existence  would  make  somewhat  of a  mockery  of  the  whole  domestic  support 
commitment concept and the claim that country-specific exceptions have been eliminated.  Perhaps 
the EU can be persuaded to decouple its compensatory payments further, to the point where they 
would meet the criteria of the "green box" and thus remain excluded from the AMS.  1995 U.S. Farm 
Bill developments will no doubt also have a bearing on this issue. 19 
When it comes to the "green box" criteria, there would appear to be considerable scope for 
further scrutiny,  analysis  and improvement.  Despite their length and detail,  the existing criteria 
represent a fairly early effort which was  not debated at any length in the negotiations, for fear of 
opening up the whole draft agreement to a process of unravelling.  A strong case can be made that 
some of the detail defies common sense, or is  at best redundant.  Canada, at least, will probably be 
keen to reconfirm (permanently) the countervail-free status of "green" programs. 
Non-agricultural Agenda Items of Agricultural Relevance 
Only a cursory review of these will be attempted here. 
There is a set of issues currently being discussed under the "trade and environment" chapeau, 
many of which can be thought of more generically.  They concern regulatory standards in several 
areas  - environmental,  animal welfare,  labour,  etc.  - and the justifiability of cross-compliance, of 
border tax adjustments, and so on.  The existence of externalities is often a factor.  These issues are 
clearly relevant to agriculture. 
In the area of contingency protection, agriculture tends to be a heavy  user of countervail 
provisions.  There is scope for more economics to be built into these rules (van Duren).  The results 
of the UR on anti-dumping are widely seen as  disappointing and weak, and as  providing an easy 
avenue for protectionist interests to exploit.  Considerable thought is being given to the possibility 
that international harmonization of competition policy could ultimately replace the need for anti-
dump actions. 
Biotechnology developments  in  the agricultural  area will  make  the TRIPS agreement of 
increasing relevance to agriculture. 20 
ANALYfICAL CHALLENGES FOR ECONOMISTS IN FUTURE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
Despite extending over 7 years, the UR negotiations occasionally proceeded with such a fury 
that no economist other than those right next to policy-makers was  in a position to influence the 
outcome.  Furthermore, good economic analysis at the bureaucrat's or academic's desk often was not 
absorbed by those making the political decisions, reasons for which are varied and some of  which are 
the economist's own fault.  However, we abstract from these considerations for the moment and focus 
on what would be ideal economic analysis to promote progress in the next multilateral negotiations 
on agriculture. 
Improving the Big Models 
A top priority for economic research is to improve the structural economic representation of 
each agricultural sector, and of particular programs and policies, in world trade models.  It is  not 
possible nor productive to attempt a detailed critique of applied multi-commodity trade models in this 
paper.  Comprehensive reviews  appear elsewhere (Buckwell and Medland; Peterson, Hertel and 
Stout; Hertel (1993)).  In summary,  certain characteristics  are common across  most large partial 
equilibrium models.  First, their economic structure is simple, with either linear or log-linear relations 
used to capture supply and demand relationships.  Second, to a large extent the effects of domestic 
and border policies are captured using price wedges rather than explicit policy variables, although as 
the negotiations continued the popular models  tended to evolve by  including more explicit policy 
detail.  Third, the models fail to capture the demand side growth effects resulting from (agricultural 
and non-agricultural) trade liberalization.  Fourth, the short-run effects of grain inventories on market 
prices tended to be overlooked.  Fifth, supply, demand and net trade almost without exception is 
modelled at the primary  level while trade in  further processed products is  neglected,  as  is  intra-
industry trade.  Sixth, the selection of commodities and countries included in the models exhibit  a 21 
developed country bias.  Seventh, cross commodity effects are captured to some extent using cross 
elasticities of supply and demand, but these are typically very small in relation to the direct price 
effects.  Eighth, resource constraints that might apply to land, labour and capital are ignored.  Ninth, 
in many cases  key  parameter estimates are based on best guesses rather than sound econometric 
analysis.  Finally, the economic understanding of some policies are so limited, or the policies under 
consideration so new that there is  little empirical basis for sound economic analysis. 
The general equilibrium models "improved" on the above by explicitly incorporating resource 
constraints, static demand side effects, broader coverage of  processing activities and generally handled 
intra-industry trade using an Armington approach.  However, these improvements came at the cost 
of much  higher  levels  of commodity  and  country  aggregation  and  typically  even simpler  policy 
structures (Hertel, 1990,  1993). 
At a minimum, the issues raised by Peterson, Hertel and Stout should be addressed including 
resource flows,  input adjustments, processing sector adjustments, imperfect price transmission and 
general equilibrium representations.  In addition, more careful and detailed representations of how 
current policies affect agent's behaviour is  critical (Sumner). 
Addressing the Agricultural Negotiation Modality Issues 
To address the question "Are both expenditure and volume constraints required on export 
subsidies and what is  the most appropriate level of commodity aggregation?" analysts will have to 
confront the linkage  between export subsidy  reduction commitments  and internal policy  reform. 
During the Uruguay Round, it was primarily the European Union that faced the dilemma of how to 
reform its  domestic policies so as  to  meet the export subsidy disciplines implied in the agreement. 
If  the cuts in export subsidies in the next round are significant, many countries will face the task of 
modifying  their domestic policies.  There will  be several options, - to cut support completely,  to 22 
embrace green policies, to adopt blue policies or supply management, etc.  In exploring export subsidy 
reduction commitment options, modellers will have to make their internal policy assumptions explicit. 
There will probably be attempts by member countries to circumvent the spirit or the letter 
of the export subsidy constraints contained in the Uruguay Round Agreement.  This may occur in the 
shipment of products under the food aid and export credit provisions of the Agreement as  well as 
price pooling schemes and the issuing of production quotas explicitly for product destined for export, 
under domestic supply management programs.  Each of these schemes will require economic analysis, 
and in some cases  such analysis  may feed into GATT panel investigations. 
An evaluation of conditions under which export credit subsidies can be viewed as  correcting 
for imperfect capital markets versus being an indirect export subsidy would be helpful.  Food aid is 
also a potential export subsidy in disguise, depending upon the conditions under which the product 
is  obtained and disbursed.  Such a determination, or the derivation of the appropriate criteria, is a 
priority for further research in preparation for future agricultural trade negotiations. 
Tariff reductions will remain an important focus in future agricultural negotiations as trade 
in  agricultural  products  is  normalized  and  tariffs  become  the  primary  instrument  for  border 
protection.  In fact, with the Uruguay Round Agreement to tariffy all non-tariff measures, the binding 
of virtually all agricultural tariffs and the creation of tariff-rate quotas there is a significant analytical 
task to be undertaken to better understand the Uruguay Round outcome.  At the most basic level 
is the calculation of the trade weighted reductions in bound and applied tariffs.  While we know that 
the simple average of tariff cuts  is  36 percent, the average trade weighted cut is  different, and no 
doubt  varies  across  countries  and  commodity  groups.  The  "effective"  size  of these  cuts  have 
implications for the model determined gains  from trade.  The World Bank has  made a useful start 
at this (Ingco).  Also, the work of Martin and Francois, in attempting to measure the economic value 
of a tariff binding, when the applied rate is  lower, needs to be extended.  Modellers need to take 23 
more care with their assumptions  about what reductions in bound rates  implies  for reductions in 
applied rates; by first researching the actual levels of both. 
Tariff escalation,  as  products move  from  the raw  to the further processed state is  also  a 
problem  in  agriculture.  With  all  developed countries  attempting  to capture more value  added 
processing at home, the relationship of raw to processed agricultural tariffs needs to be made explicit 
in our modelling frameworks. 
The widespread use of tarifT rate quotas will  significantly complicate the modelling  task, 
particularly as over quota tariffs are reduced to allow some imports at these levels.  The trade-offs, 
in terms of the welfare and trade effects, between expanding the minimum access amount (within 
quota), lowering the within quota tariff rate and/or lowering the over quota tariff rates will need to 
be explored and better understood. 
The analysis of tariff reform will be complicated by tarifT rate quota administration.  The 
details of tariff rate quota administration will determine who gets the quota rents and the distribution 
of economic welfare.  Effectively,  the creation of new export/import opportunities has  created a 
golden opportunity for  rent seeking as  the holders of import rights  will  reap substantial rewards. 
Also, the fact  that many within quota allocations have been earmarked for particular countries or 
firms, on a preferential basis, may result in odd coalitions forming to protect the newly created status 
quo, although this again depends on the details of quota administration.  Much remains to be done 
to better understand this outcome of the Uruguay Round. 
Again, the level of  commodity aggregation is important because the Uruguay Round countries 
were  given  considerable  leeway  in  how  to  allocate  minimum  access  commitments  within  broad 
commodity aggregates.  If  this same process is followed in the next round, a complete understanding 
of the trade implications of expanded minimum access  commitments will  require analysis  at a far 
more dis aggregated commodity level than was  the case for the Uruguay Round analyses. 24 
Perhaps of even more pressing concern is  the level of trade distortion implicit in the green 
and blue box  programs.  The definition  of green programs  was  left  essentially  untouched and 
unexamined after the tabling of the Dunkel Draft Text on Agriculture, and little quantitative analysis 
of green programs has been conducted although the trade distortions implicit in such programs may 
be significant. 
Some comprehensive studies on transfer efficiency argue that the presumed beneficiaries of 
farm programs (farmers) receive only a small amount of the support program expenditures, and static 
welfare  analysis  assumes  all  costs  of programs  are  captured  in  deadweight  loss  triangles.  The 
burgeoning  literature  on rent-seeking  emphasizes  that the dynamic  effects  of policy  on agent's 
behaviour generates additional costs such that part (or sometimes most) of the rectangles typically 
viewed as  transfers are also deadweight costs.  In our view,  the deadweight loss  triangles represent 
only a small portion of the true economic costs of current farm  programs (Romer).  Furthermore, 
economic costs of farm programs must be separated out from the benefits.  For example, stabilization 
programs, under certain assumptions, can reduce risk and hence increase social welfare (and output) 
independent of the subsidy element from  the government.  More careful research is  required to 
distinguish that part of policy that corrects for market failures from that which provides a pure subsidy 
to farmers. 
Blue  box  programs,  which  represented  a  political  necessity  to  get  the  Uruguay  Round 
Agreement accepted, are at best an incentive for countries to adopt supply management programs 
and at worst significantly trade distorting.  Reform of the European Union's grain sector regime is 
sufficiently recent that quantitative attempts at the analysis  of the supply implications of the new 
compensatory payments and set aside requirements are rudimentary.  In the United States, where 
supply  control  has  a  long  history,  quantitative  analysis  of the trade  distortion  implicit  in  these 
programs ranges from Gardner's (1990) which suggests the programs are essentially trade neutral to 25 
the analysis  of de Gorter and  Fisher which suggests  that these programs  have had major supply 
inducing effects since their inception.  Which of these views of the world is correct, and what should 
be done, if anything, in the GAIT to remove these trade distortions?  Future quantitative analysis 
of trade liberalization will hinge crucially on the analysis of direct payment programs encompassing 
some form  of supply control.  At the very  least,  it would  appear that the criteria for  blue box 
programs will need to be sharpened and better defined. 
Finally, two other issues  encompassed in  the Uruguay Round Agreement will  require new 
quantitative analysis.  The Uruguay Round Agreement includes a number of safeguard mechanisms 
which can be used to restrict imports.  After a few  years,  and  particularly if their use  has  been 
frequent, analysis of whether these have been significant barriers to trade, and, if so, how they could 
be modified to remove their most trade distorting aspects in the next round of negotiations will be 
needed.  In  addition,  little  quantitative  analysis  of the sanitary and  phytosanitary  accord  of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement has  been undertaken.  However, most commentators would agree that 
as traditional non-tariff barriers are eliminated and tariffs are reduced, sanitary and phytosanitary and 
other regulatory measures will be increasingly used as a form of disguised protectionism (Kozloff and 
Runge).  There is little doubt that many sanitary and phytosanitary policies will be brought to GAIT 
panels in  an attempt to resolve these issues.  What are the implications for the future of agrifood 
trade? 
Addressing Generic Issues Important for Agriculture 
There are several key issues to be dealt with in future non-agricultural deliberations that have 
the potential to influence agricultural trade.  Trade and the environment is  one such area.  If  one 
country has  more stringent environmental regulations that causes an increase in production  costs, 
then what are the economic costs of these same farmers receiving a production subsidy or a border 26 
tax adjustment as  compensation?  Are there less  trade distorting environmental policies  that can 
achieve the same domestic policy goals?  These and many more questions require careful analytical 
and empirical research in agriculture.  Similar issues need to be analyzed for possible governmental 
responses to regulations for animal welfare and in labour codes. 
Economic analysis  of countervail and anti-dumping cases in agriculture that would lead to 
strengthening the GAIT code would also  be a major contribution.  This will  increasingly involve 
aspects of competition policy and industrial organization issues.  A related issue is  how the GAIT 
should treat single-agent buying and selling desks  (marketing boards and state trading agencies) in 
international trade.  Many of these trading organizations are exempt from  anti-trust law  and are 
sanctioned by  the government.  There is  considerable dissatisfaction in some quarters (particularly 
in  the U.S.)  about the adequacy of the current GAIT Article XVII in disciplining state trading 
enterprises which have monopoly importing or exporting powers.  More empirical analysis is needed 
on the economic effects of actual cases.  For example, is  the Canadian Wheat Board's imperfectly 
competitive behaviour any different from that of, say, Cargill? 
Communicating Results 
Over the course of the Uruguay Round, economists talked to each other a lot, in journal 
papers and in professional meetings, about the potential gains from agricultural trade liberalization. 
They did not, with some exceptions, make much effort to communicate to the potential beneficiaries 
of trade  liberalization  information  about  the size  of the stake  they  have  in  the outcome.  If 
economists  want  to see more  progress  next  time  around  this  is  one area  in  which  they  could 
concentrate.  This could include the provision of more information and transparency generally about 
the income and wealth redistribution effects of current policies.  To the extent that the direction of 
transfers is  from poor to rich, then opposition to them will be induced, which will make it easier for 27 
them to be changed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is  difficult to document the exact contribution of quantitative analysis  to the outcome of 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  It  is our assessment that it did contribute in a positive way 
to trade liberalization, particularly during the early technical stage of the discussions 1) by exposing 
the horrendous costs and limited benefits of current agricultural policies; 2) by attributing the blame 
and exposing the irrationality of competitive subsidization; 3) by helping to set the modalities of the 
negotiations;  and 4)  by  making  a strong case for  the reinstrumentation of domestic  agricultural 
policies in trade friendly ways.  However, it may  have also fueled the fires of resistance to change, 
by identifying the potential losers and the sizes of their potential losses.  The net effect of economic 
analysis on trade liberalization in agriculture in the UR is  open to question. 
Either way,  much remains to be done in analyzing and understanding the traditional agenda 
of agricultural trade liberalization.  Even more remains to be done in finding new and better ways 
of presenting these results to the general public.  In addition, an agenda reflecting new concerns with 
trade liberalization is  forthcoming which deals with issues that are less well developed theoretically 
and  analytically.  These  include  trade  and  the  environment,  dispute  settlement  mechanisms, 
safeguards, competition policy,  trade related aspects of intellectual property, and labour policy. 
It is  difficult to avoid the conclusion that the future analyses of multilateral trade deals will 
involve even larger economic models involving ever greater policy,  commodity and country detail. 
If  so, this  analysis  is  likely to become even more concentrated in the hands of a few  large,  mostly 
governmental or international organizations.  In our view,  this is  not a healthy situation.  However, 
even if it  is  true,  these models will  have to be backed up with sound qualitative, theoretical and 28 
empirical analysis of "smaller issues."  The sound assessment of market structures and key economic 
parameters will continue to be the basic building blocks of all economic analysis. 
Finally, the value at the margin (in terms of trade liberalization impact) of economists' efforts 
to better and more widely communicate their analytic results may far exceed the marginal value of 
efforts  to crank through more (or more accurate) analyses.  The most important contribution of 
agricultural economists is likely to be in the extension of all types of economic analysis, quantitative 
as well as qualitative, to key decision makers and the general public.  Only in this way can the public 
interest hope to compete with the enshrined special interest groups that have the ear of politicians. 
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